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5Executive Summary
This publication is a pre-release version of a 
chapter in the forthcoming UN Environment 
Emissions Gap Report 2018. It provides an 
assessment of the role and potential impact of 
mitigation actions by non-state and subnational 
actors such as cities, states, regions, companies, 
investors and foundations. 
Many non-state actors are engaging in 
mitigation action, across sectors and regions
Non-state and subnational actors have the 
opportunity both to be part of implementing 
mitigation commitments made at national level 
and to go beyond current pledges and raise 
ambition. The number of actors participating 
is rising fast: more than 7,000 cities from 133 
countries and 245 regions from 42 countries, 
along with more than 6,000 companies with 
at least US$36 trillion in revenue have pledged 
mitigation action. Commitments cover large 
parts of the economy and are gradually 
expanding in regional coverage. Many of the 
actors are cooperating in what are called 
‘international cooperative initiatives’. 
Other actors need to join
The numbers seem impressive, but there is 
still huge potential for expansion. Not even 20 
percent of the world population is represented 
in current international initiatives, and most 
companies around the world still can and need 
to act. On the finance side, a record of just over 
US$74 billion of Green Bonds were issued in the 
first half of this year, but still only represent a 
very small fraction of the capital markets around 
the world. 
Emission reduction potential from non-state 
and subnational action could ultimately be vast, 
but the current impact is still low and hard to 
track
The emission reduction potential from non-
state and subnational actors is large. If 
international cooperative initiatives are scaled 
up to their fullest potential, the impact could be 
considerable (up to 15-23 GtCO2e per year by 
2030 compared to current policy). If realized this 
would be instrumental in bridging the emissions 
gap to “well below 2 degrees Celsius”. 
However, this pre-release Emissions Gap Report 
chapter shows that the additional emission 
reduction contribution made so far by non-
state actors is still quite limited in relation to 
what countries have already pledged (up to 
0.2-0.7 GtCO2e per year by 2030 compared 
to full Nationally Determined Contribution 
implementation, and 1.5-2.2 GtCO2e per year 
compared to current policy). A wider, more 
comprehensive overview of all non-state and 
subnational climate action occurring globally is 
limited by the current low level of available data 
and lack of consistent reporting on tracking the 
impact of non-state and subnational climate 
action. 
Non-state and subnational actors are providing 
other crucial contributions that go well beyond 
quantified emission reductions 
Non-state and subnational actors provide 
important contributions to climate action beyond 
their quantified emission reductions. They build 
confidence in governments concerning climate 
policy and push for more ambitious national 
goals. They provide space for experimentation or 
act as orchestrators in coordination with national 
governments for climate policy implementation. 
Initiatives and actors also incentivize, support 
and inspire additional climate action by 
exchanging knowledge and good practices, by 
engaging in advocacy and policy dialogue, by 
assisting in formulating action plans, and by 
rewarding and recognizing climate actions. 
Improving performance and transparency
Non-state actors should ideally adopt more 
common principles when formulating their 
actions. Such principles should include clear 
and quantifiable targets based on relevant 
benchmarks, technical capacity of the actors, 
availability of financial incentives, and the 
presence of regulatory support. Monitoring and 
progress reporting, which are generally weak at 
the moment, are essential to document tangible 
results and gain credibility. Governments can 
play a vital role by stimulating this growing 
movement, and can for example support  
non-state actors by providing collaboration 
platforms, capacity building and technical and 
financial resources. 
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1 Introduction to the publication and 
overview of its key findings 
Global climate change governance is diversifying 
rapidly: in recent years, political attention has 
been acknowledging the increasingly important 
role of non-state and subnational actors such 
as cities, states, regions, companies, investors, 
foundations, civil society organizations, and 
cooperative initiatives. 
This publication, provides an assessment 
of non-state and subnational actors’ role in 
enhancing global climate ambition and bridging 
the emissions gap, based on the most recent 
literature. 
Non-state and subnational actors (NSAs) can 
take individual action to address climate change, 
or they can cooperate with other actors and, 
frequently, with national governments. This 
report confirms that there is clear evidence 
that NSAs are increasingly committing to 
individual climate actions and coming together 
in international cooperative initiatives. In all 
sectors and regions, more commitments have 
been formulated and registered compared to 
the assessment in the 2016 UN Environment 
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that only a 
fraction of the NSA activity occurring globally is 
being consistently reported and quantified at the 
international level.  
The emission reduction potential from NSAs is 
large and could, if fully implemented, contribute 
significantly to bridging the 2030 emissions 
gap. However, realizing this potential requires 
commitments and action that go far beyond 
current pledges made by individual actors or 
single initiatives, and implies the scaling up of 
multiple initiatives across sectors and regions. 
The few studies that estimate the 2030 global 
emission reductions from commitments 
currently pledged by individual actors compared 
to the Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) find that their additional contribution is 
modest.  
Limited data transparency and a lack of 
consistent reporting that tracks implementation 
of NSA climate action prevent a full picture of 
the global impact, although reporting practices 
are improving and clearer results are emerging. 
Nonetheless, there is still limited knowledge on 
the extent to which NSAs are implementing their 
actions and realizing their commitments.  
NSAs’ contributions to climate change action go 
beyond direct emission reductions. For example, 
they can play a key role in building confidence in 
governments concerning the implementation of 
climate policies and inspire higher national and 
global ambition. In addition, NSAs can facilitate 
catalytic linkages, act as orchestrators, and 
provide a basis for experimentation. Quantitative 
analyses that emphasize NSAs’ direct 
contributions to climate mitigation may overlook 
these aspects of the critical role that NSAs can 
play in global climate change governance.
In recent years, great progress has been made 
in terms of understanding what fosters and 
influences their performance. Solid design 
principles and context markers are emerging, 
including: effective leadership, permanent 
secretariat (for cooperative initiatives), clear and 
quantifiable targets, monitoring and progress 
reporting systems, technical capacity of actors, 
financial incentives, sustainable funding, and the 
presence of regulatory support. By following or 
establishing these principles and contexts, NSAs 
can help bridge the emissions gap and foster 
credibility, and governments can help establish 
the required support. 
7The publication begins with a brief overview of 
the increasing engagement of NSAs in the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) process (section 2), before 
examining the landscape and trends in terms of 
NSAs’ individual commitments and international 
cooperative initiatives (ICIs) (section 3). Section 
4 provides an assessment of the emission 
reduction potentials estimated by the latest 
studies and looks at, non-quantifiable, roles of 
NSAs that have important implications for global 
climate change governance. The final section 
summarizes some of the key ways forward for 
harnessing the potential of NSAs’ climate action 
to bridge the emissions gap (section 5).
2 Non-state and subnational actors and 
climate change negotiations: from Paris 
to Katowice
The 2015 Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC held in Paris showed an increased 
institutionalization of processes and engagement 
of NSAs (UNEP, 2016). Specifically, the Paris 
Agreement:
• Encourages Parties to work closely with 
non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts to 
strengthen mitigation and adaptation action 
(paragraph 118)
• Encourages non-Party stakeholders to 
register their climate actions in the Non-
State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform 
(paragraph 117)
• Strengthens the technical examination 
process on mitigation for the period 
2016–2020 in various ways (paragraphs 109 
and 110)
• Convenes a high-level event building on 
the Lima–Paris Action Agenda during the 
period 2016–2020 in conjunction with each 
session of the Conference of the Parties 
(paragraph 120)
• Appoints two high-level champions on 
behalf of the President of the Conference 
of the Parties to catalyse NSAs (paragraph 
121).
The Decision also mandated a summary for 
policymakers based on more information 
gathering and an analysis of the potential of, and 
results from, NSAs (paragraph 111(c)). In sum, 
the process leading up to the Paris Agreement 
and the outcomes of Decision 1/CP.21 have paved 
the way for an increasingly prominent role for 
NSAs under the climate regime to support Parties 
in reaching the mitigation and adaptation goals. 
The Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate 
Action was launched by the first two high-level 
champions1 during the 2016 Conference of the 
Parties to continue mobilizing NSAs, support 
the implementation of the targets set out by 
the Parties, and align NSAs’ actions with the 
Sustainable Development Goals (MP Work 
Programme 2017–2018). To this end, round 
tables were organized on how climate action and 
various Sustainable Development Goals could be 
mutually supportive.  
During the Conference of the Parties in 2017, the 
champions were asked to align the Marrakech 
Partnership with the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue that 
takes stock of the efforts of Parties towards 
goals set out in the Paris Agreement and aims to 
inform the preparation of new or updated NDCs 
by 2020 (Decision 1/CP.23, Annex II). They also 
presented the first ever yearbook on climate 
action that reports on actions by non-Party 
stakeholders (which is the term the UNFCCC uses 
for NSAs) throughout the year. The yearbook, 
including the forthcoming 2018 edition, is 
expected to inform the Talanoa Dialogue. By April 
2018, 109 inputs from NSAs had been registered 
on the Talanoa Dialogue online platform, and 
more are expected in time to inform the political 
phase of the Talanoa Dialogue, which will take 
place at the Conference of the Parties in Katowice 
in December 2018.
In parallel with the UNFCCC process, national and 
regional initiatives have emerged to stimulate 
and support NSAs in the European Union, Latin 
America and Asia, among others (Chan et al., 
2018). Fossil Free Sweden (Fossilfritt Sverige), for 
instance, is an initiative launched by the Swedish 
government in which a national coordinator 
engages companies, municipalities and other 
non-Party stakeholders in showcasing climate 
action, sharing experiences, and encouraging new 
actors to take on commitments. The Argentinian 
government has launched the National Climate 
Change Cabinet (NCCC) initiative, with a view to 
increasing the participation of businesses and 
civil society in tackling climate change nationally 
through technical round tables and coordination. 
In India, the Energy and Resources Institute’s 
Council for Business Sustainability has been 
engaging corporate leaders in climate action 
since 2001 (Chan et al., 2018).
3 Overview of non-state and subnational 
actor initiatives and individual 
commitments 
Cities, states, regions, businesses, civil society 
and a range of other actors can take individual 
and cooperative actions to address climate 
change. Acknowledging that action by NSAs 
comes in many forms, this section focuses 
on two categories: actions by individual NSAs 
(section 3.1) and cooperative actions through 
international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) 
(section 3.2), both of which are on the rise. By 30 
August 2018, just over 12,500 commitments to 
action had been recorded in the Non-State Actor 
Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), the largest 
online platform showcasing climate efforts by 
subnational and non-state actors. Almost two 
thirds of these commitments are by individual 
actors, while just over one third are by cooperative 
initiatives (including international cooperative 
initiatives. See also Box 1).
1 Dr. Laurence Tubiana (France) and Dr. Hakima El Haite (Morocco).
3.1 Individual commitments by non-state 
and subnational actors
Individual NSA climate actions take a variety 
of forms, referred to in the literature as 
‘commitment’, ‘action’, ‘initiative’, and ‘target’. 
These generally refer to a “diverse set of 
governance activities taking place beyond 
strictly government and intergovernmental (or 
multilateral) settings” (Chan and Pauw, 2014). 
When individual actors participate in ICIs or 
transnational climate governance initiatives, 
they may define an individual commitment or 
climate action according to the specific set of 
rules that an initiative or programme identifies. 
When an NSA abides by that particular initiative, 
it constitutes an instance of “participation” 
(Andonova et al., 2017).
The landscape of NSA actors and the 
commitments they pledge on climate change 
are varied, ranging from city, state and regional 
governments to companies, investors, higher 
education institutions and civil society 
organizations. These actors often pledge climate 
action through a range of networks that collate 
individual climate pledges and inventories (for 
example, C40 Cities for Climate Leadership) or 
reporting platforms such as the CDP (formerly 
known as the Carbon Disclosure Project). The 
criteria for participation within these networks 
and platforms vary: some networks require 
members to pledge specific commitments, such 
as greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, or 
to submit regular emissions inventories. Others 
emphasize peer-to-peer knowledge sharing and 
capacity-building, while some are membership-
based networks that do not require actors to 
commit to specific goals. 
While these networks capture many NSA climate 
actions, they do not comprehensively cover all 
NSA climate actions occurring globally. 
Box 1 Defining international cooperative initiatives
Although there is no single definition of an international cooperative initiative (ICI), a number 
of terms and common characteristics help characterize them. When non-state or subnational 
actors from at least two different countries “adhere to rules and practices that seek to steer 
behaviour towards shared, public goals” across borders (Andonova et al., 2017), they engage 
in “transnational climate governance” (Andonova et al., 2009). Broader coalitions made up 
of countries, companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, international 
organizations or subnational public actors, such as cities and regions, form cooperative initiatives 
(Blok et al., 2012). When these coalitions cross national borders they become “international 
cooperative initiatives” (Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015).
Actor group 2015 2017
Cities 7,025 from 99 countries, 
representing 11 percent of 
the global population
7,378 from 133 countries, 
representing 16.9 percent 
of the global population
States and regions 116 regions from 20 
countries, representing 
11 percent of the global 
population
245 regions from 42 
countries, representing 
17.5 percent of the global 
population
Companies and investors 4,431 companies from 88 
countries and over 400 
investors, with more than 
US$25 trillion in assets 
under management
6,225 companies and 
investors from 120 
countries, representing at 
least US$36.5 trillion in 
revenue
Banks 15 of the 20 largest banks 34 of the 57 largest 
banks, representing 
US$3.1 trillion in market 
capitalization 
Higher education 
institutes
Not assessed 700 colleges and 
universities in the United 
States, with a total student 
population nearing 1 
million and a collective 
endowment of over 
US$250 billion 
Data source: Hsu et al., 2015b; Hsu et al., 2016, Hsu et al., 2017
Table 1: Examples of the growth in individual NSA actor participation from 2015 to 2017
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For instance, national networks of NSAs 
and individual actions that are not reported 
in global climate action databases are not 
included in the analysis here (see also Box 2). 
Analysis suggests, however, that individual 
NSA participation through these networks 
has increased since the 2015 Paris climate 
negotiations (Table 1 - possible overlaps are 
not taken into account). These positive trends 
indicate the continued and growing role of NSAs 
in global climate governance. The following 
section captures an overview of some of these 
NSA constellations and their membership. 
Subnational governments – cities, states and 
regions
There are several networks connecting city, 
state and regional action on climate change. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of some of these, 
illustrating the number of NSA city participants 
and their geographical distribution. Networks 
include the Global Covenant of Mayors for 
Climate & Energy (GCoM), signed by  9,130 cities 
representing 775.5 million people worldwide 
or just over 10 percent of the global population 
(Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, 
2018). The GCoM includes the EU Covenant 
Box 2 Framing climate action in developing countries
Linkages between sustainable development and climate change provide a powerful rationale for 
climate action. Evidence suggests that citizens are more likely to take climate action, or to support 
government action on climate change, if the sustainable development benefits of these efforts 
are emphasized (Floater et al., 2016). Communicating the sustainable development gains that 
are often co-generated alongside climate mitigation or adaptation may be particularly important 
among NSAs in developing countries and the Global South. 
One example is the Indian city of Rajkot, which “has emerged as a climate innovator” by 
focusing on projects that deliver urban development benefits, and support climate action as 
a supplementary goal or co-benefit. The political feasibility of climate action increases when 
connected to “more familiar, and often more immediate, urban priorities” (Bhardwaj and Khosla, 
2017). A survey of various climate action experiments also found that climate actions were 
aligned with development priorities. 
However, if actions and policies that generate substantial mitigation or adaptation benefits are 
framed and registered according to their ability to reduce poverty, create jobs, foster economic 
growth, or protect public health, they may fall under the radar of climate accounting efforts. This 
might be one of the reasons for the lower representation of NSA climate action in developing 
countries and the Global South.
Source: Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL (2018) 
Figure 1: Regional distribution of NSA city participants in carbonn, C40 Cities, CDP Cities, Global 
Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, and Climate Mayors
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of Mayors for Climate & Energy that reports 
7,755 signatories with 252.6 million inhabitants 
within the EU (EU Covenant, 2018). All of these 
members commit to either submitting individual 
Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans or 
pledging a 40 percent reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2030. ICLEI, a global network of 
subnational governments, has developed the 
carbonn Climate Registry that includes more 
than 1,000 cities, towns and regions, drawn from 
89 countries and accounting for 9 percent of the 
world’s total population (ICLEI, 2018). 
In terms of state and regional governments 
taking action, the Compact of States and Regions 
(2017) includes 110 regional governments from 
36 countries, representing 658 million people and 
18 percent of the world economy and baseline 
emissions of 3.9 GtCO2e. These governments 
have committed to 290 climate actions focused 
on emissions reductions, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency that are estimated to result 
in total (cumulative) emissions reductions of 
21.9 GtCO2e between 2010 and 2050, if climate 
targets are reached on time (The Climate Group, 
2017). 
Companies and investors
CDP reports that over 6,300 companies 
representing a combined purchasing power of 
over US$3 trillion responded to their climate 
change questionnaire, and that over 650 
investors with assets of US$87 trillion participate 
(CDP, 2018). In 2017, CDP recorded primary data 
from over 4,800 companies, of which 47 percent 
noted an emissions reduction or renewable 
energy target (CDP, 2018). 
A few reports detail financial investors’ 
actions on climate change. The Climate Bonds 
Initiative’s 2018 Green Bonds Summary found 
that US$74.6 billion in green bonds were issued 
during the first half of 2018, by 156 issuers 
from 31 countries (Climate Bonds Initiative, 
2018). The United States and China topped the 
list of countries where the most bonds were 
issued, and most proceeds support projects 
in the energy, buildings, and land-use sectors 
(Climate Bonds Initiative, 2018). The Low Carbon 
Investment (LCI) Registry currently includes 53 
investors from 21 countries, with US$50 billion 
in low-carbon assets (Global Investor Coalition 
on Climate Change, 2018) – a slight increase 
on the 2014 assessment, which found 45 
investors reporting investments valued at US$24 
billion, most of which (44 percent) focused on 
renewable energy (Global Investor Coalition on 
Climate Change, 2014).
3.2 International cooperative initiatives
By engaging large and growing numbers of 
NSAs, international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) 
can lead to considerable emission reductions, 
provided that their stated goals are realized and 
emissions reductions do not displace action 
elsewhere (Graichen et al., 2017; Blok et al., 2012; 
Hsu et al., 2015; UNEP, 2015; Widerberg and 
Pattberg, 2015; see also section 4). 
In addition to direct emission reductions, ICIs can 
play a number of other important roles, including 
providing proofs of concept for low-emissions 
development strategies, spurring technology 
development and diffusion, and helping generate 
momentum for additional initiatives and 
activities (Weischer et al., 2012).
Several databases collect information on ICIs. 
They vary in number of initiatives, often due to 
different definitions of ICIs, purposes, focus 
areas, data collection methods and sources 
(UNEP, 2016; Widerberg and Stripple, 2016). The 
summary of trends in this section focuses on 
mitigation-related ICIs and is based on data from 
the Climate Initiatives Platform, which is regularly 
updated, includes clear criteria for inclusion, and 
is publicly accessible.2 
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2 The Climate Initiatives Platform is hosted by UN Environment and the UNEP DTU Partnership. It includes ICIs that fulfil the following 
criteria:
 • Includes several non-state actors taking voluntary action, and may also include states;
 •  Have an objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or to increase resilience, or could bring about greenhouse gas emission 
reductions or increased resilience;
 • Have an international scope or the potential for significant impact on a global scale; and
 • Have a focal point. 
 Source: http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Climate_Database:About. 
The main features of these ICIs are captured in 
Figures 2 and 3.
Trend in numbers of ICIs
The Climate Initiatives Platform currently records 
244 initiatives, of which 220 are mitigation-
focused and are implemented in more than 
one country.3 Since the 2016 UN Environment 
Emissions Gap Report, 17 new initiatives have 
been added to the platform.  
Over the past two decades, the number of ICIs 
has grown significantly, with peaks in launches 
of new initiatives around large climate events 
such as COP15 in 2009, the United Nations 
Climate Action Summit convened by United 
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2014, 
and COP21 in 2015 (Figure 2). The slowdown 
in the number of new initiatives in 2016, 2017 
and 2018 may reflect a shift in focus towards 
implementing the initiatives created in earlier 
years, as well as the importance of global 
political forums in catalysing the formation of 
ICIs.  
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Figure 2: Number of international cooperative initiatives launched each year, between 2000 and 2018
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Figure 3: Overview of features of 220 mitigation-focused ICIs
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4 Numbers for the lead organizations, type of action, region, and year of initiation are taken from analysis conducted by and published on 
the Climate Initiatives Platform website at: http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/ICI_Analysis [accessed on 24 August 2018]. 
Regional participation 
As Figure 3 illustrates, many initiatives operate 
in several regions. Although the overall increase 
in recorded mitigation-focused ICIs since 2016 
is relatively limited, regional participation in 
ICIs has increased in nearly every region of the 
world. The biggest increase is in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, where the number of ICIs 
has increased from 6 in 2016 to 25 in 2018. In 
Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, regional 
participation has roughly doubled compared with 
2016. It is worth noting that global ICIs may be 
active in regions with relatively low participation 
in regional ICIs, such as South-Eastern Asia and 
the Middle East. Furthermore, while ICI activities 
have been concentrated in high- and middle-
income countries (Chan et al., 2015; Chan et 
al., 2018; Pattberg et al., 2012), the number of 
ICIs operating in lower-income countries grew 
dramatically between 2015 and 2017, rising 
by 56 percent in low-income countries, and 50 
percent in lower-middle income countries (United 
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2017).5
Sectors
Most ICIs (149 out of 220) cover multiple 
sectors, generally focusing on key sectors where 
the mitigation potential is significantly higher 
than the emission reductions implied by current 
policies and NDCs: the energy, industry, forestry, 
transport, agriculture, and building sectors 
(UNEP, 2017). An ICI’s sectoral emphasis often 
shifts according to the needs and capacities of 
the regions where it is implemented. Actions 
focused on resilience and agriculture, for 
example, are most commonly implemented in 
low-income and middle-income economies, while 
initiatives addressing the industrial sector are 
most prevalent in high-income or upper-middle 
income economies (Chan et al., 2018). 
Setting goals and tracking progress 
The percentage of ICIs that have set 
quantitative goals remains low, at around 22 
percent. Quantitative goals – defined as a 
specific, measurable goal made either by an 
initiative or an initiative’s members – range 
from focusing on emissions reduction (for 
example, reduce emissions by a specific 
amount by a specific year), to fund-raising (for 
example, raise, distribute or invest a specific 
amount of funds), to capacity-building (for 
example, reach a specific number of people or 
communities). Similar low levels of quantitative 
goals are reported in other studies (Chan et al., 
2018; Graichen et al., 2017; Hsu et al., 2015; 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017; Widerberg 
and Stripple, 2016; Pattberg et al., 2012). 
Graichen et al. (2017) found that 75 percent of 
the 174 ICIs they surveyed either did not include 
sufficient information about their targets, had 
unclear goals, or did not propose concrete 
actions. Focusing on emissions reduction 
targets, Hsu et al. (2015) found that just 8 out 
of 29 initiatives contained explicit emissions 
mitigation targets tied to a particular year. A 
study conducted by UNEP (2015) used a similar 
approach to narrow a list of 184 initiatives 
down to 15. However, among initiatives with 
clear emissions reductions targets, many have 
made more ambitious emission reduction 
commitments than national governments 
(Graichen et al., 2017).
Monitoring, reporting, and verification practices 
also remain weak across ICIs: just under 
23 percent of ICIs on the Climate Initiatives 
Platform noted regular monitoring or reporting 
mechanisms. Other studies also report relatively 
low percentages of initiatives with established 
monitoring and reporting mechanisms, ranging 
from 31 percent (Graichen et al. 2017), to 43 
percent (Pattberg et al., 2012) or 44 percent 
(Chan et al. 2018). Hsu et al. (2015a) found that 
more than half (18) of 29 ICIs announced at the 
United Nations Climate Action Summit convened 
by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon in 2014 included provisions for monitoring 
progress, but that very few of these identified 
specific indicators to track performance. 
Bansard et al. (2016) likewise noted that the 
type and stringency of monitoring requirements 
varied widely among city-focused initiatives. 
Furthermore, many initiatives do not conduct 
or share cost estimates or feasibility studies, 
adding an additional barrier to efforts to assess 
the feasibility and identify potential barriers to 
initiatives (Roelfsema et al., 2015). Striving for 
“more and better” data collection (Widerberg 
and Stripple, 2016) from initiatives is required 
to facilitate efforts to assess ICIs’ progress and 
anticipate their contributions to climate action 
and sustainable development efforts (Roelfsema 
et al., 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; 
Hsu et al., 2016). Some ICIs have developed 
approaches that demonstrate how this could be 
accomplished. The Bonn Challenge, for instance, 
maintains an interactive online dashboard 
tracking its signatories’ commitments, and 
their potential collective progress towards the 
initiative’s goal.6 
Lead organization and secretariat
The existence of a secretariat and a lead 
organization is likely to influence ICI 
performance (Pattberg and Widerberg, 2016). 
Initiatives with a permanent secretariat report 
both higher-than-average potential emission 
reduction contributions in 2020 and 2030, and 
higher indirect impacts, complementary goals 
and co-benefits, such as diffusion of information, 
political effects, technology development, 
reduced air pollution, improved health, and 
strengthened energy security and economic 
development (Graichen et al., 2017). Similarly, the 
active involvement of NGOs, as either leaders or 
ICI members, has been shown to be associated 
with higher potential emission reductions and 
potentially larger co-benefits (Graichen et al., 
2017). 
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5 Part of the increase may include adaptation-focused ICIs.
6 See http://www.bonnchallenge.org/
Almost all (217) of the ICIs included in this 
report state that they have a secretariat, in many 
cases hosted by one of the larger organizations 
participating in the ICI. Based on the information 
in the Climate Initiatives Platform, it is not 
possible to assess how many of these 
secretariats are permanent. In fact, some 
studies suggest that most ICIs lack a permanent 
secretariat (Graichen et al., 2017; Chan, 2018). 
Functions  
ICIs primarily provide information and 
knowledge-related services to their participants 
(Figure 3). Although the distribution of functions 
has remained relatively stable over time, a few 
new functions have recently emerged, including 
financing and fund-raising. In a recent survey 
of 75 ICIs, funding was found to be the most 
common challenge, reported by approximately 
30 percent of respondents (UNFCCC, 2017). 
Meanwhile, financial and organizational capacity 
tends to be associated with high-performing 
ICIs (Chan et al., 2015; Chan and Pauw, 2014; 
Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions, 
2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Biermann et 
al., 2007). The recent growth in ICIs’ fund-raising 
and financing activities is therefore promising 
and may suggest increased efforts to address 
the challenges reported.  
4 The potential contribution of non-state 
and subnational actors to enhancing 
ambition and bridging the 2030 
emissions gap
NSAs contribute to global climate change 
governance in numerous ways. At the 
international level, there is particular interest 
in how much NSAs could contribute to global 
greenhouse gas emission reductions by 
2030 and the extent to which these potential 
contributions are already included in national 
current policy and NDC estimates. Section 
4.1 assesses the most recent studies on 
these issues, while section 4.2 addresses the 
questions related to tracking the progress 
and results of NSA action. NSAs also play 
a number of critical roles that do not easily 
lend themselves to quantification, but may 
nevertheless be important to enhancing ambition 
and bridging the 2030 emissions gap. Section 
4.3 provides a brief overview of such roles.  
4.1 Estimates of potential emission 
reductions in 2030 of non-state and 
subnational actors
The 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2016) 
published an overview of quantitative analyses 
of the potential contribution of NSA actions to 
global emissions mitigation in 2030, illustrating 
a wide range of results. Since these estimates 
were published, the number of studies that 
quantify NSAs’ potential contribution to global 
climate action has grown, with more networks 
and researchers conducting analysis of 
aggregate impact of member groups on global 
emissions. These studies can be divided into 
three categories:  
1. Individual commitments: estimate the 
aggregate impact on emissions from 
pledges by individual cities, regions or 
business actors that commit to fully 
implement the targets they set themselves.  
2. Single initiatives: estimate the potential 
impact on emissions from a single 
cooperative initiative goal, assuming this 
is implemented by all actors under the 
initiative. Often, individual actors subscribe 
to a collective cooperative initiative (which 
can be an ICI) that together sets a goal for 
the initiative. The single initiative studies 
assess the emission reductions of the 
initiative’s goals, rather than pledges 
that individual actors take themselves. 
The estimated emission reductions 
subsequently involve some scaling up of 
the potential.
3. Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives: 
estimate the potential emission reductions 
from several initiatives that would occur 
if the initiatives reached a transformative 
impact at the sector- or economy-wide 
level. These studies apply a range of 
significant assumptions on how actions are 
expanded; from assuming that all members 
within a network will adopt an ICI’s 
ambitious emission reduction goal, to that 
membership will grow to a certain number 
of actors and cover a certain number of 
additional sectors. These studies therefore 
estimate greater reduction potential at the 
sector- or economy-wide level.
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Table 2 provides an overview of available studies, 
organized according to these three categories. 
The table shows the wide range of potential 
emission reductions estimated in various studies 
– from companies based in the United States 
of America contributing 0.026 GtCO2e in 2025 
(America’s Pledge, 2018) to as much as 15 to 23 
GtCO2e in 2030 based on an evaluation of the 
scaled-up potential of 21 cross-sector, multi-
actor ICIs (Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL, 
2018). 
Due to the variable baseline methodologies 
and assumptions adopted by each study, as 
well as different scopes in terms of actors and 
emissions covered, the wide range of overall 
impact assessment is unsurprising. Some 
studies focus on NSA impact in a single country, 
such as the United States of America (for 
example, Roelfsema, 2017), while other single 
initiative studies evaluate emissions savings 
relative to business-as-usual scenarios for the 
actor group, rather than comparing to a global 
scenario.
Only some studies report a range of results that 
take into consideration assumptions such as 
a lower and upper range of results (Kuramochi 
et al., 2017; Roelfsema, 2017; CDP and We 
Mean Business, 2016; Graichen et al. 2017; 
Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL, 2018), and 
even fewer conduct sensitivity analyses. Not all 
studies include estimates of overlap between 
actor groups to adjust the resulting emissions 
reductions accordingly. In some cases, studies 
do not take into consideration overlap between 
actor groups’ impact, while others may select 
for analysis only the most ambitious actor 
pledges from the same geography or sector 
(Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL, 2018; 
America’s Pledge, 2018). Other reports, such as 
the U.S. Climate Alliance (2017) report analysing 
15 regions’ contributions to greenhouse gas 
reductions or the Nordic Council of Ministers’ 
report on NSAs in Nordic countries (Nordic 
Council of Ministers, 2017), do not provide an 
aggregate quantified assessment of impact. 
They are therefore not included in Table 2. 
The studies included in Table 2 all assume 
various baseline scenarios against which they 
assess additional impact of NSAs. These 
baseline scenarios range from study-specific 
“business as usual” or no-action scenarios, to 
“current policy scenarios” that take into account 
a range of existing government policies and 
pledges, to an “NDC scenario” that assumes 
that countries implement their NDCs under the 
Paris Agreement (Table 2; Hsu et al., in review). 
Consequently, it is challenging to compare the 
estimated impact across studies, although 
meta-analyses of methodologies applied in each 
study demonstrate similar approaches, including 
the use of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol 
standard for distinguishing between direct 
and indirect emissions (Hsu et al., in review). 
Specifications of baseline scenarios by which to 
compare additional NSA contributions are also 
increasingly converging to common terminology 
and methods.  
A major question with respect to NSA climate 
mitigation contribution is the extent to which 
this leads to emission reductions that are not 
accounted for in current national policies or 
in the NDCs. A limited number of the available 
studies assess NSA mitigation impact relative 
to global current policy and NDCs based on 
an assessment of overlap scenarios (see 
Table 2). These quantitative assessments 
of overlap determine the ambition level of 
NSA commitments vis-à-vis current policy 
scenarios and NDC scenarios by comparing 
the rate of emissions decline in actors’ targets 
(Kuramochi et al., 2017). For instance, if a city’s 
emission reduction target results in a steeper 
rate of decline in overall emissions compared 
to a national government’s NDC, a common 
assumption is to consider the emissions 
reductions that are beyond what a national actor 
has pledged as “additional” reductions.
One analysis focused on the United States of 
America (Kuramochi et al., 2017), found that 17 
states and 54 cities with recorded greenhouse 
gas mitigation commitments comprise 40 
percent of national United States of America 
emissions after accounting for overlaps. 
These commitments, which do not represent 
pledges made after the national administration 
announced its intent to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement in June 2017, were found to have 
the potential to meet almost half of the United 
States of America’s NDC by 2025. Another study 
that quantified nearly 6,000 subnational and over 
2,000 business commitments determined that 
emissions would be 0.2 to 0.7 GtCO2e/year lower 
in 2030 than with NDCs alone (Yale, NewClimate 
Institute, and PBL, 2018, Figure 4). 
Figures 4a and 4b illustrates the wide range 
of potential emission reductions estimated in 
various studies. The figure includes the studies 
from Table 2 that have clear and comparable 
baseline scenario definitions by which to assess 
the magnitude of additional impact. Figure 4a 
includes estimates from studies that aggregate 
from a bottom-up method of pledged 2030 
commitments made by individual actors. As this 
figure illustrates, the pledged 2030 contribution 
by NSAs, if fully realized, is estimated to lead to 
limited additional emission reductions (ranging 
from 3 to 700 MtCO2e, as indicated in Table 
2) compared to the full implementation of the 
unconditional NDCs.
Figure 4b includes estimates of scaled-up 
potential emission reductions based on an 
assessment of single initiative goals and 
multiple initiatives’ goals. These studies assume 
that all actors participating within their initiative 
fully implement and achieve the larger goal of 
an initiative and therefore represent “scaled-
up” potential that is larger than the estimates 
in Figure 4a. The studies behind the estimates 
in Figure 4b apply a range of assumptions on 
how actions are expanded, from assuming that 
all members within a network will adopt an 
ICI’s ambitious emission reduction goal, to that 
membership will grow to a certain number of 
actors and cover a certain number of additional 
sectors. 
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Notes
a) For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided in Figures 4a and 4b.
b) Studies for which baseline scenarios are based on trajectories for the actor group as a whole, rather than compared to a global 
scenario, are shown with no fill to indicate that the extent to which these projections are comparable to the Emissions Gap Report 
scenario values for 2030 is less certain.
c) Studies that are cross-hatched indicate these studies evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded 
and quantified pledges. They rely on assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantified 
analysis of individual actors’ NSA pledges.
d) Studies that are outline cross-hatched indicate that both b) and c) applies.
e) No extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made. 
Baseline not based
on global scenario
Both of the above
* Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL
Scaled up potential
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Source: Based on data in Table 2.
Note: a) For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided in Figures 4a and 4b.
 b)  Studies for which baseline scenarios are based on trajectories for the actor group as a whole, rather than compared to a global scenario, are 
shown with no fill to indicate that the extent to which these projections are comparable to the Emissions Gap Report scenario values for 2030 is 
less certain.
 c)  Studies that are cross-hatched indicate these studies evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantified 
pledges. They rely on assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantified analysis of individual 
actors’ NSA pledges.
 d) Studies that are outline cross-hatched indicate that both b) and c) applies.
 e) No extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.  
Figure 4: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies
The figure indicates that NSAs have the potential 
to contribute significantly to bridging the 2030 
emissions gap, but that realizing this potential 
requires commitments and action that go far 
beyond current recorded and quantified individual 
actor pledges as well as single initiatives.
4.2 Tracking progress and results of  
non-state and subnational actors
Data limitations and gaps
As the previous sections illustrate, limited 
availability, consistency and comparability of 
data pose significant challenges to evaluating 
the potential NSA impact on climate mitigation 
and their other benefits. For instance, Bansard 
et al. (2016) found in their evaluation of cities 
participating in the C40 Cities for Climate 
Leadership Network that out of around 40 
members evaluated, nine different base years 
with seven different target years were found, 
making an evaluation and comparison of targets 
and level of ambition difficult. 
Although the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate 
Action acts as an umbrella for various NSA 
climate action repositories, no comprehensive 
database of NSA actions exists, with each NSA 
adopting various criteria for inclusion that are 
often unclear or opaque (Widerberg and Stripple, 
2016). The reported data are often not suited to 
calculating emissions impact, estimating overlap, 
or comparing NSA mitigation potential to the 
emissions scenarios of other actors, such as 
national governments. 
Key information, such as actors’ target and 
baseline emissions, emissions scopes (that 
is, direct or indirect), and inventory emissions 
with historic time-series available, are often 
inconsistently reported (if at all), with subnational 
actors from the European Union reporting the 
largest amount of data required for mitigation 
impact assessments and the greatest gaps found 
in emerging and developing countries (Hsu et al. 
2018, in review). 
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Finally, as the figures in this report exclude 
national cooperative initiatives and networks, 
they underestimate the scale and spread of NSA 
climate actions, particularly in regions where 
actors have less access or capability to engage 
with transnational initiatives.
Some efforts under way to address data 
reporting and methodological consistency 
should help improve the future data landscape 
for analysing NSAs’ contributions. For example, 
the World Resources Institute’s Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol Initiative released in 2015 (the Global 
Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Inventories (Fong et al., 2015)) and 
a consortium of non-government institutes, 
through the Initiative for Climate Action 
Transparency (ICAT), are currently developing 
guidance for NSAs, national governments and 
other audiences to account for and measure NSA 
climate mitigation contributions (see also Box 
3). These and other efforts should help improve 
consistency among NSA-reported data.
Tracking progress on NSA implementation 
achievement of targets 
Although efforts to improve the monitoring, 
reporting and evaluation of NSA actions are 
increasing (see previous section and Box 
4), studies and information regarding NSA 
implementation – progress towards achieving 
targets and whether actors are meeting their 
goals – are still scarce (Chan et al. 2015; 2018). 
Part of the difficulty of tracking implementation 
is that ex-post measurement of results is largely 
lacking, given the nascent nature of many NSA 
climate actions. Therefore, most available 
studies quantifying the mitigation impact of 
NSAs assess their potential emission reductions, 
rather than ex-post or achieved results.
To bolster confidence in NSA contributions 
to bridging the 2030 emissions gap, data on 
implementation are critical to understanding 
whether current targets and goals are being 
reached and 2030 potentials are likely to be 
achieved. 
Box 3 Monitoring, reporting and verification success stories
Monitoring, reporting and verifying the emissions inventories and commitments of both national 
actors and NSAs is key to global climate change assessment and governance, as there is a risk 
that actors participate in transnational climate governance initiatives to “greenwash” or boost 
their reputations, without setting or implementing meaningful climate action targets (Hsu et al., 
2016; Okereke, 2007; Mayer and Gereffi, 2010). Some NSAs, however, are making their emissions 
inventories more transparent and making progress on implementing climate actions. For example, 
Scotland, Wales, and the Australian Capital Territory all compile particularly comprehensive 
greenhouse gas emissions inventories, which account for the emissions of one or more 
greenhouse gases from sources within a defined space and time. Each government also goes one 
step further, by having these inventories externally verified. 
Scotland’s inventory (Scottish Government, 2017) covers a wide range of emissions sources, 
and researchers draw on a variety of data sources – including government statistics, regulatory 
agencies, trade associations, individual companies, and surveys and censuses – to develop 
approaches that measure their contributions. Even as the inventory tailors and adjusts the 
approach it uses to calculate emissions from a diverse range of sources, it remains consistent 
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s international guidance on national 
inventory reporting. 
Similarly, Wales aligns its inventory with international guidelines and provides extensive 
information on its emissions, recording how much heat seven greenhouse gases7 could trap in the 
atmosphere over a 100-year period (Aether and Ricardo Energy & Environment, 2016).8 
While the Australian Capital Territory receives annual emissions data from a national database, 
these data are often too coarse for the Territory’s monitoring goals. The district therefore collects 
its own electricity, gas, transport and waste data, to supplement the information it receives from 
the national government (Australian Capital Territory Government, 2017). 
Note: This box draws heavily on insights shared by The Climate Group’s Compact of States and Regions initiative.9
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7 Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, nitrogen trifluoride and sulfur hexafluoride.
8 In more technical terms, the inventory shares the global warming potential of these gases over a 100-year time horizon.
9 In particular, we thank Milimer Morgado and Jean Charles Seghers for their help in compiling these examples.
Box 4 Improving monitoring, reporting and verification in international cooperative 
initiatives
Many initiatives are improving their commitment pledging and evaluation process. For example, 
CDP is starting to collect this information through its Assessing Low-Carbon Transition (ACT) 
initiative that provides data, indicators and feedback for companies to align their targets with 
2ºC scenarios. Some city networks, including ICLEI and the EU Covenant of Mayors, are reporting 
on their members’ progress, although currently only a fraction (1,743 out of more than 6,000 
members with action plans) list progress reports on their website. The Science-Based Targets 
initiative helps companies to set internal climate targets that are aligned with the long-term 
mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement. The initiative currently includes over 100 companies with 
science-based targets and over 300 companies wanting to develop such targets.
Some studies question the extent to which NSA 
implementation and achievements to date have 
delivered real emission reductions (Chan et al., 
2015; 2018; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017). 
One analysis found that out of more than 300 
collaborative non-state partnerships announced 
at the 2002 World Sustainable Development 
Summit, nearly 65 percent were yet to be 
operationalized 10 years later (Pattberg et al., 
2012).
Nevertheless, from the studies available, a 
number of aspects that are likely to influence 
the implementation and performance of NSA 
actions are emerging (see also section 3.2).  
Graichen et al., (2017); ICAT, (2018); Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa, (2017); Pattberg and 
Widerberg, (2016) show that these aspects 
include: 
• leadership and permanent secretariat (for 
cooperative initiatives), 
• target clarity and ownership, 
• the presence of monitoring and progress 
reporting mechanisms,
• past achievement of results, actors’ 
technical capacity, 
• financial incentives and the availability of 
funding, 
• a commitment’s vulnerability to political 
considerations, 
• and the presence of regulatory support.
It should be noted that while monitoring, 
reporting and verification procedures are 
important in terms of enabling learning and 
boosting credibility among individual actors and 
initiatives, they may dissuade new NSAs from 
taking climate action. In ICIs in particular, if the 
goals and monitoring, reporting and verification 
procedures are considered too much of an 
administrative burden, it could discourage their 
further expansion.
4.3 Contributions by non-state and 
subnational actors beyond direct 
emission reductions
NSAs’ contributions to climate change action 
go beyond their quantifiable potential emission 
reductions: they can play a key role in building 
government confidence in implementing climate 
policies and they can signal and push for greater 
ambition. Quantitative analyses that emphasize 
NSAs’ direct contributions to climate mitigation 
may overlook the critical other roles that they 
play in global climate change governance, 
such as capacity-building, knowledge transfer 
and coalition building, as these important NSA 
actions are difficult to quantify. Other examples 
include facilitative or catalytic actions, such 
as low or zero-carbon norm creation, or policy 
foundations, such as voluntary emissions 
registries, which may produce longer-term 
societal transitions towards decarbonization (van 
der Ven et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, studies that analyse the roles and 
functions of NSAs in national and global climate 
change governance that are difficult to quantify 
are emerging. These studies highlight three roles 
and functions as particularly important:
• Facilitating catalytic linkages (for example, 
Betsill et al., 2015) with national actors that 
are often informal in nature, but allow for 
actors such as national governments to 
address underlying drivers of emissions, 
build capacity, or shape low-carbon 
development contexts;
• Acting as potential orchestrators (for 
example, Chan et al., 2018; Abbott et al., 
2012) in climate policy implementation 
and coordination with national and 
intergovernmental actors; 
• Providing experimentation (for example, 
Bernstein and Hoffmann, 2018; 
Hoffmann, 2011) for policy instruments or 
implementation deemed too risky or costly 
at the national level.
Box 5 provides examples of the orchestration 
role of NSAs.
19
Box 5 Orchestration of non-state and subnational action around the world
Actors and networks in developed and developing countries are incentivizing NSAs to act, 
identifying and addressing possible barriers to them doing so, and supporting NSA capacity-
building to enable them to take effective action on climate change. Such orchestration efforts are 
resulting in a growing number of NSAs taking climate action.
Example 1: ActionLAC
ActionLAC, a partnership set up by the Latin American Fundación Avina, aims to accelerate climate 
action and strengthen ambition in Latin America. Targeting actors such as community-based 
organizations, small enterprises, and local governments, this partnership fosters inclusive climate 
governance in Latin America. ActionLAC provides support throughout the “life-cycle of climate 
actions”, which includes (1) mobilization of action; (2) elaboration of action plans; (3) mobilization 
of finance; (4) support for implementation; (5) monitoring and measuring through self-reporting; 
and (6) communication of results to help improve policies. Moreover, it aims to raise awareness 
and stimulate learning between local and regional actors by connecting local actors with global 
processes and national policymaking.
Example 2: Cities and Regions Talanoa Dialogues
ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability, together with the Global Covenant of Mayors for 
Climate & Energy and UN-Habitat, are facilitating Cities and Regions Talanoa Dialogues around 
the world, in response to similar dialogues in the context of the UNFCCC. These dialogues – 50 of 
which have been scheduled throughout 2018 – engage actors that have often not been adequately 
involved in national climate efforts to date. The dialogues aim to advance the New Urban Agenda 
adopted in 2016, and to strengthen multilevel governance and national climate plans. For 
instance, they explore pathways for actively engaging subnational governments in formulating 
national climate investment plans. So far, about half of the scheduled dialogues are in developing 
countries. 
Example 3: European Dialogue on Non-State Climate Action
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the EU advisory body comprising 
representatives from workers’ and employers’ organizations, established the European Dialogue 
on Non-State Climate Action (ED-NSCA). This dialogue aims to strengthen and increase the 
scope and scale of European-based non-state climate action among constituencies that are often 
not traditionally known as main actors in environment and climate change, including workers’ 
and employers’ organizations in the industrial, agricultural and transport sectors. The European 
Dialogue envisages supporting non-state climate action by: (1) assessing actions; (2) recognizing 
actions; (3) improving governance; (4) accelerating actions; and (5) supporting actions. So far 
the EESC has, for instance, organized “participatory circles” with multiple stakeholders to explore 
means of tracking non-state climate action in Europe; to identify options for recognizing non-
state action; to shape an enabling networking and learning environment; and to facilitate finance 
through and for non-state action.  
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5 Opportunities for harnessing the potential of 
NSA climate action to enhance ambition and 
bridge the emissions gap
The previous sections illustrate the magnitude, 
diversity and potential contributions of NSAs to 
climate change action, forming the basis for a 
number of recommendations on how to further 
strengthen NSAs’ action to realize their emission 
reduction potential. These recommendations are 
briefly summarized below.  
First, more actors must engage in climate action. 
Scaling up individual and collaborative climate 
action to more geographic areas, sectors and 
types of actors could significantly contribute 
to realizing the large mitigation potential of 
NSAs. NSAs from previously under-represented 
regions of the world are starting to take action. 
However, many regions, particularly in the Global 
South, are still under-represented in terms of 
participants, lead organizations, and the location 
of secretariats. Encouraging NSAs in developing 
countries to engage in initiatives would 
facilitate climate action in growing economies 
with potentially large and low-cost mitigation 
potentials. Scaling up also entails ensuring a 
broad range of sectors, including currently under-
represented ones such as oil and gas.  
Second, Governments can play a vital role 
by stimulating this growing movement, and 
can for example support non-state actors by 
providing collaboration platforms, capacity 
building and technical and financial resources. 
Furthermore, national political institutions are 
crucial to transnational climate action. For 
instance, stronger national policies tend to be 
positively correlated with greater participation 
in transnational governance (Andonova et 
al., 2017). Governments can also support the 
implementation of individual commitments. 
In order to support urban climate action, for 
example, governments could develop policies 
and approaches for enhancing the capacity of 
local governments, including providing financial 
investments and enabling private investments to 
lower greenhouse gases (Broekhoff et al., 2018). 
Third, transparency is critical to assessing NSA 
actions and tracking their implementation. This 
report clearly shows that although progress 
is being made, transparency and related 
monitoring, reporting and verification standards 
require improvement at all levels: individual, 
cooperative initiative, and global. Commitments 
are often vague in terms of goals, language 
and enforcement mechanisms, while different 
baselines, timelines and assessment frameworks 
are used to report on progress (Bansard et al., 
(2016). Implementing monitoring, reporting 
and verification mechanisms for cooperative 
initiatives is particularly important, in order to 
document tangible results, NSA climate actions 
could gain credibility among the broader public 
and decision makers. These mechanisms would 
also facilitate learning, allowing the organization 
to assess performance on an ongoing basis and 
to experiment with new approaches.
Data collection and reporting efforts are starting 
to enable more sophisticated analysis on the 
potential for NSA climate action to contribute 
additional greenhouse gas reductions beyond 
national governments commitments. However, 
data gaps (particularly in high-emitting sectors 
and developing countries) limit these analyses, 
meaning they do not necessarily capture the 
diversity of the NSA climate action taking 
place. Particularly where sustainable economic 
development is a pressing concern, NSA 
climate action takes on different forms besides 
participation in transnational climate action 
networks, focusing also on adaptation, capacity-
building and resilience functions that are more 
difficult to quantify and aggregate on a global 
scale. 
Finally, NSAs play different important roles and 
functions and their contribution to global climate 
change governance goes beyond what can be 
measured in terms of direct emission reductions. 
These aspects – including orchestration, 
catalytic effects, and experimentation –should 
therefore be kept in mind.
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